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NEW ARTICLE 9 TRANSITION RULES
BRADLEY Y. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
Consistent with the scope and detail of the proposed Revised
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("Revised Article 9")
itself, Part 7 of the statute provides a detailed set of rules governing
the transition from prior law to the full implementation of Revised
Article 9. This article addresses these transitional rules. First, it offers
an overview of Part 7 and a description of its component sections.
Second, it discusses the principal policy decisions reflected in the
transition provisions. Finally, it addresses selected issues likely to
arise in practice during the period of transition.
I. OVERVIEW OF TRANSITION PROVISIONS
Section 9-701 establishes the effective date of Revised Article 9,
which in the uniform version is scheduled for July 1, 2001. This date
reflects a significant delay from the time the statute was initially
introduced for legislative action. This deferred effectiveness for
Revised Article 9 has two principal objectives. First, it allows an
additional period of almost three years following approval of the
statute by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws for various affected parties to familiarize themselves with
and adapt their practices to the requirements of the new law. Second,
and more importantly, deferral makes it possible for Revised Article
9 to become effective simultaneously in a large number of
jurisdictions. Both of these factors should mitigate transitional
problems.
Section 9-702 (Savings Clause) states three general transitional
rules. Under subsection (a), Revised Article 9 applies to a transaction
or lien entered into or created prior to the effectiveness of Revised
* The author practices law with Davis Polk & Wardell in New York City. He was a
member of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and chaired the Transition Task Force which
advised the Drafting Committee on Part 7.
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Article 9, except as otherwise provided in Part 7. Hence, any party
wishing to defer or avoid a requirement of full compliance with
Revised Article 9 immediately upon its effectiveness must identify a
provision in Part 7 which enables it to do so. Subsection (b) states an
exception to this general rule. Under subsection (b), transactions and
liens outside the scope of the current version of UCC Article 9 ("Old
Article 9"), which were validly entered into or created prior to
effectiveness of Revised Article 9, remain valid and may be
"terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced" either in
accordance with prior law or under Revised Article 9. Subsection (b)
is itself, however, subject to the further provisions of Part 7, which
significantly limit the impact of its validation of existing non-Article 9
liens that are within the scope of Revised Article 9. Subsection (c)
states the conventional rule that Revised Article 9 does not affect
litigation or other proceedings pending at the effective date.
Sections 9-703 (Security Interest Perfected Before Effective
Date) and 9-704 (Security Interest Unperfected Before Effective
Date) deal with a security interest which is enforceable against the
debtor under prior law immediately prior to the effective date and
which is either perfected or unperfected under prior law at that time.
In the case of a perfected security interest governed by section 9-703,
subsection (a) states the unsurprising rule that it continues as a
perfected security interest if the applicable requirements for
enforceability and perfection under Revised Article 9 are satisfied at
the effective date. If the Revised Article 9 requirements for either
enforceability or perfection are not met at the effective date,' then
subsection (b) affords a one-year grace period within which these new
requirements may be met. This one-year grace period is subject to
section 9-705, discussed below, which specifies special rules applicable
to changes in perfection requirements. Although the drafting
approach is slightly different, section 9-704 affords a substantially
identical one-year grace period for the unperfected but enforceable
security interest under prior law that fails to meet the enforceability
1. The Official Comments give as an example a perfected pre-effective-date security
agreement in a consumer transaction which covers "all securities accounts." See R. § 9-703 cmt.
2. This collateral description, while sufficient under existing law, is not enforceable under
Revised Article 9 because it fails to meet the specificity requirements of section 9-108(e)(2) for
consumer transactions. Note that such a security interest, since it was subject to Old Article 9, is
not covered by the savings clause of section 9-702(b); however, section 9-703 would dictate the
same result even if it were. Other examples include any transaction (e.g., a sale of a payment
intangible) which, by virtue of the expanded scope of Revised Article 9, becomes subject to a
Statute of Frauds type requirement under section 9-203 that may not have existed under prior
law. See id. § 9-703 cmt. 2.
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requirements of Revised Article 9. In addition, section 9-704 specifies
when this unperfected security interest may become perfected under
Revised Article 9. If action sufficient to perfect the security interest
under Revised Article 9 is taken at or before the effective date, the
security interest is perfected at the effective date. If such action is
taken after the effective date, the security interest is perfected at that
time.
Section 9-705 (Effectiveness of Action Taken Before Effective
Date) deals generally with security interests as to which the steps
relied upon to achieve perfection are taken prior to the effective date
but which security interests attach and become enforceable after the
effective date. Subsection (a) addresses perfection by steps other than
filing which are sufficient under Old Article 9 or other applicable law
but which are not sufficient under Revised Article 9. In this instance,
the pre-effective-date perfection steps continue to be effective as to
collateral to which the security interest attaches after the effective
date for a period of one year. The bailee with notice cited in Example
2 in the Official Comments to section 9-703 could serve as well to
illustrate the operation of section 9-705(a): to the extent the secured
party is relying on a pre-effective-date notice to a bailee for
perfection as to then existing and thereafter acquired collateral (as
might be the case under certain mortgage warehousing
arrangements), it benefits from the same one-year grace period as to
both existing and future collateral within which period it must secure
the bailee's authentication of a record acknowledging that it holds for
the secured party.
Section 9-705(b) addresses pre-effective-date filings, stating that
they are effective to the extent they satisfy the requirements for
perfection by filing under Revised Article 9 even if they were not
effective for that purpose when filed. Note that there are a variety of
different reasons why a previously ineffective filing may become
effective under Revised Article 9. The secured party may have
consciously decided to "prefile" in the filing jurisdiction mandated by
Revised Article 9 before it was necessary or legally effective to do so.
Alternatively, such a filing may simply have been made in error. In
addition, descriptions of collateral which were ineffective either
generally or as to particular types of collateral may become effective
under Revised Article 9.2 Subsection (b) gives effect to all such filings,
2. There are actually three different types of collateral descriptions that may fall into this
category. First, Revised Article 9, unlike Old Article 9, permits perfection by filing as to
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whether to the calculated or serendipitous benefit of the secured
party.
Section 9-705(c) continues the effectiveness following the
effective date of Revised Article 9 of a financing statement filed in
the appropriate jurisdiction to achieve perfection under Old Article 9.
Thus, a financing statement which satisfied applicable requirements
for perfection under Old Article 9 operates to perfect a security
interest for purposes of Revised Article 9 notwithstanding the fact
that Revised Article 9 may require filing in a different jurisdiction.
However, unless a longer period of effectiveness is provided for in
subsection (d) or (e) of section 9-705 or in section 9-706, the pre-
effective-date financing statement ceases to be effective at the earlier
of the time it would have lapsed (absent continuation) under the law
of the filing jurisdiction or June 30, 2006.
Section 9-705(d) deals with the filing of a continuation statement
(as opposed to an initial financing statement filed as a continuation
statement under section 9-706) after the effective date of Revised
Article 9 with respect to an original financing statement filed prior to
such effective date. Such a continuation statement is effective for
purposes of Revised Article 9 if, and only if, it is filed to continue the
effectiveness of a financing statement filed in the same office in the
same jurisdiction as would be required for an initial filing under
Revised Article 9. Thus, if Revised Article 9 does not result in a
change in the applicable filing office, pre-effective-date filings may be
continued through the filing of a conventional continuation
statement; otherwise, if Revised Article 9 requires filing in a different
jurisdiction or filing office, continuations may only be effected by
filing an initial financing statement in accordance with section 9-706.
The following examples from the Official Comments illustrate
the operation of subsection (d):
Example 2: On November 8, 2000, D, a State X corporation,
creates a security interest in certain manufacturing equipment
located in State Y. On November 15, 2000, the secured party
perfects a security interest in the equipment under [Old] Article 9
by filing in office of the State Y [(location of the equipment)]
Secretary of State. See [Old] Section 9-103(1)(b). [Revised Article
9] takes effect in States X and Y on July 1, 2001. Under Section
instruments. Compare id. § 9-312(a) with U.C.C. § 9-304(1). Second, Revised Article 9 validates
a filing covering "all personal property" or the like, see R. § 9-504(2), which is insufficient under
current case law. Finally, security interests in some new types of collateral brought within
Revised Article 9 (e.g., commercial tort claims) may be perfected by filing. See id.
§ 9-109(d)(12).
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9-705(c), the financing statement ceases to be effective in
November, 2005, when it lapses. See Section 9-515. Under [Revised
Article 9], the law of D's location (State X, see Section 9-307)
governs perfection. See Section 9-301. Thus, the filing of a
continuation statement in State Y after the effective date would not
continue the effectiveness of the financing statement....
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that D is a State
Y corporation. Assume State Y adopted UCC Section 9-401(1)
(second alternative). State Y law governs perfection under Part 3 of
[Revised Article 9]. (See Sections 9-301, 9-307.) Under the second
sentence of subsection (d), the timely filing of a continuation
statement in accordance with the law of State Y continues the
effectiveness of the financing statement.
Example 4: The facts are as in Example 3, except that the collateral
is equipment used in farming operations and, in accordance with
[Old] Section 9-401(1) (second alternative) as enacted in State Y,
the financing statement was filed in State Y, in the office of the
Shelby County Recorder of Deeds. Under [Revised Article 9], a
continuation statement must be filed in the office of the State Y
Secretary of State. See Section 9-501(a)(2). Under the second
sentence of subsection (d), the timely filing of a continuation
statement in accordance with the law of State Y operates to
continue a pre-effective-date financing statement only if the
continuation statement is filed in the same office as the financing
statement. Accordingly, the continuation statement is not effective
in this case, but the financing statement may be continued under
Section 9-706.
Example 5: The facts are as in Example 3, except that State Y
enacted [Old] Section 9-401(1) (third alternative). As required by
former Section 9-401(1), SP filed financing statements in both the
office of the State Y Secretary of State and the office of the Shelby
County Recorder of Deeds. Under [Revised Article 9], a
continuation must be filed in the office of the State Y Secretary of
State. See Section 9-501(a)(2). The timely filing of a continuation
statement in that office after [Revised Article 9] takes effect would
be effective to continue the effectiveness of the financing statement
(and thus continue the perfection of the security interest), even if
the financing statement filed with the County Recorder lapses.3
Section 9-705(e) deals with financing statements filed against a
transmitting utility under Old Article 9. Under both Old section
9-403(6) and Revised section 9-515(f), a financing statement filed
against a debtor identified as a transmitting utility is effective until a
termination statement is filed, and has no scheduled lapse date.
Subsection (e) of section 9-705 gives effect to this rule by making
subsection (c)(2), which establishes June 30, 2006 as the outside date
3. R. § 9-705 cmt. 5.
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for continued perfection of pre-effective-date filings, applicable to a
financing statement filed against a transmitting utility only if Revised
Article 9 would require filing in a different jurisdiction.
Section 9-705(f) states the rule that a financing statement
comprising both an initial filing made prior to the effective date of
Revised Article 9 and a continuation statement filed after such
effective date "is effective only to the extent that it satisfies the
requirements of Part 5 [of Revised Article 9] for an initial financing
statement." In other words, to the extent that the pre-effective-date
filing does not itself satisfy those requirements, the continuation
statement must remedy the deficiency. The Official Comments give as
an example collateral consisting of the right to payment for real
property sold which is a "general intangible" under Old Article 9 but
an "account" under Revised Article 9.4 To continue perfection as to
this collateral, a continuation statement must contain an indication of
collateral that satisfies the requirement of section 9-502(a).1 Assuming
that the pre-effective-date filing identified the collateral only as
"general intangibles" and that this description was not supplemented
or corrected by the continuation statement, perfection would lapse at
the time the pre-effective-date filing would, in the absence of
continuation, cease to be effective under section 9-705(c).6 Similarly,
the requirements of Revised Article 9 as to sufficiency of the names
of the debtor and secured party must be met upon filing of the
continuation statement.
As noted above, section 9-705(d) governs situations in which a
pre-effective-date financing statement may be continued through the
filing of a continuation statement in the same filing office. In
situations where Revised Article 9 mandates a filing in a different
jurisdiction or filing office, a pre-effective-date financing statement
may be continued only pursuant to section 9-706 (When Initial
Financing Statement Suffices to Continue Effectiveness of Financing
Statement). As the title implies, this section contemplates the filing of
4. See id. § 9-705 cmt. 6.
5. See id.
6. The language of section 9-705(f) on its face suggests that perfection would lapse upon
the filing of the continuation statement, but this seems inconsistent with section 9-705(c). Note
the difference in treatment for purposes of a financing statement on the one hand, and a
security agreement on the other hand, of terms defined differently in Revised Article 9. For
purposes of financing statements, the terms are presumed to have their new defined meanings,
see id. § 9-705 cmt. 6; for purposes of security agreements, the question is one of intent of the
parties under the circumstances, which will probably mean that the old definitions remain
applicable for pre-effective-date security agreements, see id. § 9-703 cmt. 3.
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an initial financing statement, containing all the information that
would be required for an initial financing statement under Revised
Article 9 and, in addition, identifying the pre-effective-date financing
statement to be continued.7 Such a filing continues the effectiveness
of the pre-effective-date financing statement for the period applicable
to an initial financing statement, as specified in Old section 9-403 if
the continuation filing is made prior to the effective date of Revised
Article 9 and for the period specified in section 9-515 if the
continuation filing is made after the effective date.8 Note that an
initial financing statement filed pursuant to section 9-706 need not be
filed within the six-month period prior to scheduled lapse of the prior
filing as would be required for a continuation statement.9
Section 9-707 (Persons Entitled to File Initial Financing
Statement or Continuation Statement) confirms the authority of the
secured party of record to authorize such a filing (or any other filing
necessitated by the requirements of Part 7 in order to perfect or
continue the perfection of a security interest), without further
authorization from the debtor. 10
Section 9-708 (Priority) deals with priority contests. The base line
rule, stated in subsection (a), is that Revised Article 9 determines the
priority of conflicting claims to collateral unless the relative priorities
of the parties were established before its effective date. In the latter
cases, Old Article 9 will determine priority. The following examples
from the Official Comments illustrate the operation of this rule:
Example 1: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to
payment for goods sold ("account"). SP-1 fails to file a financing
statement. [Revised Article 9] takes effect on July 1, 2001.
Thereafter, on August 1, 2001, D creates a security interest in the
same account in favor of SP-2, who files a financing statement.
[Revised Article 9] determines the relative priorities of the claims.
SP-2's security interest has priority under Section 9-322(a)(1).
Example 2: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to
payment for goods sold ("account"). SP-1 fails to file a financing
statement. In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same account
in favor of SP-2, who likewise fails to file a financing statement.
[Revised Article 9] takes effect on July 1, 2001. Because the relative
priorities of the security interests were established before the
effective date of [Revised Article 9], [Old] Article 9 governs
7. See id. § 9-706(c).
8. See id. § 9-706(b).
9. See id. § 9-706 cmt. 1.
10. See id. § 9-707 cmt.
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priority, and SP-1's security interest has priority under [Old]
Section 9-312(5)(b).
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that, on August 1,
2001, SP-2 files a proper financing statement under [Revised
Article 9]. Until August 1, 2001, the relative priorities of the
security interests were established before the effective date of this
Article, as in Example 2. However, by taking the affirmative step of
filing a financing statement, SP-2 established anew the relative
priority of the conflicting claims after the effective date. Thus,
[Revised Article 9] determines priority. SP-2's security interest has
priority under Section 9-322(a)(1).
As Example 3 illustrates, relative priorities that are "established"
before the effective date do not necessarily remain unchanged
following the effective date. Of course, unlike priority contests
among unperfected security interests, some priorities are
established permanently, e.g., the rights of a buyer of property who
took free of a security interest under [Old] Article 9.
Example 4: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to
payment for lottery winnings (a "general intangible" as defined in
[Old] Article 9 but an "account" as defined in [Revised Article 9]).
SP-1's security interest is unperfected because its filed financing
statement covers only "accounts." In 2000, D creates a security
interest in the same right to payment in favor of SP-2, who files a
financing statement covering "accounts and general intangibles."
Before this [Revised Article 9] takes effect on July 1, 2001, SP-2's
perfected security interest has priority over SP-1's unperfected
security interest under [Old section] 9-312(5). Because the relative
priorities of the security interests were established before the
effective date of [Revised Article 9], [Old] Article 9 continues to
govern priority after [Revised Article 9] takes effect. Thus, SP-2's
priority is not adversely affected by [Revised Article 9's] having
taken effect.
Note that were [Revised Article 9] to govern priority, SP-2 would
become subordinated to SP-1 under Section 9-322(a)(1), even
though nothing changes other than [Revised Article 9's] having
taken effect. Under section 9-704, SP-1's security interest would
become perfected; the financing statement covering "accounts"
adequately covers the lottery winnings and complies with the other
perfection requirements of [Revised Article 9], e.g., it is filed in the
proper office.
Example 5: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to
payment for lottery winnings-a "general intangible" (as defined
under [Old] Article 9). SP-1's security interest is unperfected
because its filed financing statement covers only "accounts." In
2000, D creates a security interest in the same right to payment in
favor of SP-2, who makes the same mistake and also files a
financing statement covering only "accounts." Before [Revised
[Vol. 74:1339
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Article 9] takes effect on July 1, 2001, SP-1's unperfected security
interest has priority over SP-2's unperfected security interest,
because SP-1's security interest was the first to attach. See [Old]
Section 9-312(5)(b). Because the relative priorities of the security
interests were established before the effective date of [Revised
Article 9], [Old] Article 9 continues to govern priority after
[Revised Article 9] takes effect. Although Section 9-704 makes
both security interests perfected for purposes of [Revised Article
9], both are unperfected under [Old] Article 9, which determines
their relative priorities."
Section 9-708(b) provides a special priority rule for certain party
contests that in accordance with subsection (a) are governed by
Revised Article 9. Under subsection (b), the first-to-file-or-perfect
rule of section 9-322(a) is modified in its application to a security
interest that becomes enforceable under Revised Article 9 and is
perfected by a pre-effective-date filing that is effective under Revised
Article 9 but that would not have been effective under Old Article 9.
For purposes of section 9-322(a), the priority of such a security
interest dates from the effective date of Revised Article 9 rather than
from the date of filing.12 This rule, however, does not apply to two
competing security interests each of which was perfected by such a
filing. The following examples from the Official Comments illustrate
the operation of subsection (b):
Example 6: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in D's existing
and after-acquired instruments and files a financing statement
covering "instruments." In 2000, D grants a security interest in its
existing and after-acquired accounts in favor of SP-2, who files a
financing statement covering "accounts." After [Revised Article 9]
takes effect on July 1, 2001, one of D's account debtors gives D a
negotiable note to evidence its obligation to pay an overdue
account. Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in Section 9-322(a),
SP-1 would have priority in the instrument, which constitutes SP-2's
proceeds. SP-1's filing in 1999 was earlier than SP-2's in 2000.
However, subsection (b) provides that, for purposes of Section
9-322(a), SP-1's priority dates from the time [Revised Article 9]
takes effect (July 1, 2001). Under Section 9-322(b), SP-2's priority
with respect to the proceeds (instrument) dates from its filing as to
the original collateral (accounts). Accordingly, SP-2's security
interest would be senior.
Example 7: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in D's existing
and after-acquired instruments and files a financing statement
covering "instruments." In 2000, D grants a security interest in its
11. Id. § 9-708 cmt. 1.
12. See id. § 9-708 cmt. 2.
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existing and after-acquired instruments in favor of SP-2, who files a
financing statement covering "instruments." After [Revised Article
9] takes effect on July 1, 2001, one of D's account debtors gives D a
negotiable note to evidence its obligation to pay an overdue
account. Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in Section 9-322(a),
SP-1 would have priority in the instrument. Both filings are
effective under [Revised Article 9], see Section 9-705(b), and SP-1's
filing in 1999 was earlier than SP-2's in 2000. Subsection (b) does
not change this result. 3
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The most significant issues addressed in Part 7 relate to
circumstances where steps sufficient to achieve perfection of a
security interest under Old Article 9 or other prior law are not
sufficient under Revised Article 9. The transition provisions reflect a
policy that such changes should not unfairly defeat the rights of a
secured party. This policy, however, is tempered by the need
ultimately for all parties to be playing by the same set of rules-i.e.,
the uniform application of the requirements of Revised Article 9. The
transition provisions strike a balance between these competing
considerations.
Empirically, the change in perfection requirements under
Revised Article 9 which will affect the most transactions is a change
in the required filing jurisdiction. Revised Article 9 makes two
significant changes in the rules which determine the appropriate filing
jurisdiction. First, all filings are now to be made in the jurisdiction
where the debtor is located.14 Under Old Article 9, filings as to goods
(e.g., inventory and equipment) are to be made in the jurisdiction
where the goods are located. 5 Second, the location of a debtor which
is a registered entity is the jurisdiction under whose law it is registered
(e.g., Delaware for a Delaware corporation or limited liability
company) rather than its principal place of business as under existing
law. 16 This will in many cases result in a new filing jurisdiction even
for collateral which is currently perfected by filing in the jurisdiction
where the debtor is located. 7 While one could in theory have
13. Id.
14. See id. § 9-301(1). There are, of course, limited exceptions to this rule, most notably for
fixture filings, security interests in timber to be cut, and security interests in as-extracted
collateral. See id. § 9-301(3)-(4).
15. See U.C.C. § 9-103(1).
16. Compare R. § 9-307(e) with U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d).
17. It is not clear how large a volume of transactions will be affected by this change. While
no doubt a popular corporate domicile such as Delaware will see some increase in UCC filings
[Vol. 74:1339
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required new filings to have been completed not later than the
effective date of Revised Article 9, that approach was rejected by the
Drafting Committee. Instead, similar to the transition provisions
adopted for the 1972 amendments to Article 9, pre-effective-date
filings remain effective until their scheduled lapse date.18 This
approach reflects a belief that the need to continue a financing
statement is a natural occasion to require the secured party to
consider whether filing in a different jurisdiction may be called for
and will contribute to an orderly transition to the new filing regime.
While this will mean a need to search in two or more jurisdictions
during the transitional period, this is probably not a materially greater
amount of searching than that routinely done under existing law. By
virtue of clause (2) to section 9-705(c), this period is limited to a
maximum of five years and would not be extended in those
jurisdictions which provide for non-uniform periods of effectiveness
longer than five years for initial financing statements. Furthermore,
the transition provisions encourage early compliance with Revised
Article 9 filing requirements by validating pre-effective-date filings in
the new filing jurisdiction. 19
In adopting the same policy as that reflected in the 1972
transition provisions, however, the Drafting Committee made one
significant change. Despite the general rule that filings of record on
the effective date of the 1972 amendments remained effective until
their scheduled lapse date, this rule did not apply to collateral
acquired by the debtor after the effective date of the statutory
amendments.20 As a result, secured parties relying on a floating pool
of collateral such as accounts or inventory were as a practical matter
required to refile immediately. Part 7 of Revised Article 9, however,
applies the same rule to both existing and after-acquired collateral.
As to after-acquired collateral, this result is mandated by section
9-705(c); as to existing collateral, this result is mandated by section
9-703(b), which in turn defers to section 9-705 to the extent
applicable.
Beyond such changes in the applicable filing jurisdiction, Revised
under this rule, such limited empirical study as has been made suggests that the overwhelming
majority of filings will continue to be made in the same jurisdiction as under Old Article 9. See
Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be the Proper Place for
Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577, 581, 605-11 (1995).
18. See U.C.C. § 11-105(1) (1972).
19. See R. §§ 9-705(b), 9-706(b).
20. See U.C.C. § 11-105(2).
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Article 9 imposes a requirement of filing in order to achieve
perfection in a number of transactional contexts where there is no
such requirement under existing law. In some cases, this results from
the inclusion in the scope of Revised Article 9 of collateral previously
excluded, notably commercial tort claims and certain medical
insurance claims.21 In other cases, this results from the inclusion in
Revised Article 9 of types of transactions previously not covered,
including "true" consignments and sales of assets which are "general
intangibles" under Old Article 9 but "accounts" under Revised
Article 9.22 Finally, Revised Article 9 requires filing for agricultural
liens.23
The 1972 transition provisions generally allowed a three-year
grandfathering period during which a secured party perfected without
a UCC filing under prior law could file under the amended UCC and
retain its priority.2 4 The recently adopted Article 8 amendments, on
the other hand, reduced the analogous grace period to four months.25
The New York version of the recently adopted Article 8 amendments
extended the grace period to twelve months.26 Similarly, the transition
provisions as enacted in New York, California, and a number of other
leading commercial states in connection with the original adoption of
the 1962 UCC incorporated an analogous one-year grace period,
although interestingly the uniform law recommended at that time
would have afforded a perpetual grace period for security
arrangements perfected under pre-UCC law. 27
The new statute opts for a one-year grace period rather than a
longer or shorter period. Particularly given the delay in the initial
effectiveness of Revised Article 9, it does not appear that a longer
grace period is necessary in order that secured parties have a
reasonable opportunity to learn of the change in law. As discussed
above in connection with the change in filing office, the same one-
year grace period is made applicable to both existing and after-
acquired collateral through the operation of sections 9-703 and 9-705.
This same one-year grace period is similarly made applicable to
various other changes in perfection requirements imposed by the
21. See R § 9-109(d)(8), (12).
22. See id. § 9-109(a)(4). Compare id. § 9-102(a)(2) with U.C.C. § 9-106.
23. See R. §§ 9-109(a)(2), 9-310.
24. See U.C.C. § 11-106(1)-(2).
25. See U.C.C. § 8-603(b) (1994).
26. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 8-601(c) (McKinney 1997).
27. See U.C.C. § 10-102(2) (1962).
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Revised Article 9, including the necessity that possession by a bailee
be accompanied by the bailee's acknowledgment that it holds on
behalf of the secured party in order for the bailee's possession to
result in perfection, as well as the requirement of perfection by
control over deposit accounts, which is an incremental requirement in
those states whose version of the UCC currently covers deposit
accounts.28 Finally, sections 9-703 and 9-704 adopt the same one-year
grace period for compliance with new requirements for
enforceability.
Beyond the grandfathering and grace periods described above,
the transition provisions make Revised Article 9 fully effective on its
effective date, reflecting the policy judgment that there was no need
to further defer its application.
III. PRACTICE DURING THE TRANSITION
During the transition from existing law to Revised Article 9,
which for practical purposes has already begun, parties will need to
address perfection and priority issues under both Old Article 9 and
Revised Article 9. As to Old Article 9, it will of course be necessary
to continue to perfect security interests in accordance with existing
law until the July 1, 2001 effective date of Revised Article 9.
Furthermore, for a transitional period continuing until at least June
30, 2006, it will be necessary to conduct searches in filing jurisdictions
determined under Old Article 9, since pre-July 1, 2001 filings in those
jurisdictions will continue to be effective even without continuation
under Revised Article 9.29
Practice under Revised Article 9, conversely, will likely
commence prior to July 1, 2001, and indeed the statute and Part 7 in
particular have been crafted to encourage early compliance. Filings
made in a Revised Article 9 filing jurisdiction will become effective
upon the effectiveness of the new statute, even though the statute was
not effective when the filing was made and, indeed, even though the
statute may not have been enacted at the time of filing. Hence,
because of the inherent efficiency, it will likely become common
practice in connection with transactions entered into prior to July 1,
2001, for filings to be made in the Revised Article 9 filing jurisdiction
simultaneously with the filings under Old Article 9. Note that the
28. See R. § 9-703(b).
29. See id. § 9-705 cmt. 4.
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initial filing in the Revised Article 9 jurisdiction should be drafted as
a continuation of the contemporaneous filing under Old Article 9 so
as to preserve the priority associated with the filing date of the latter.
To the extent the Revised Article 9 filing operates solely as an initial
filing rather than as a continuation, its priority will generally date
from the effectiveness of Revised Article 9 rather than from its date
of filing in circumstances where priority is governed by Revised
Article 9.30
Revised Article 9 also encourages the continuation of pre-
existing filings at an early time, and secured parties may wish to take
advantage of this opportunity. Note, as highlighted in the comments,
that it is possible for a single financing statement filed as a
continuation statement under Revised Article 9 to continue a number
of prior filings under Old Article 9 so long as the requisite data as to
each of the filings to be continued are included.31 However, perfection
by filing under Old Article 9 must not lapse prior to the effective date
of Revised Article 9.32 One caveat here is that it would probably not
be advisable to attempt an early continuation of an existing filing
under Old Article 9 that is scheduled to lapse prior to the
effectiveness of Revised Article 9. Since, under section 9-706, the
continuation filing under Revised Article 9 must identify the most
recent continuation of the Old Article 9 filing, it is at least arguable
that the continuation to be identified must be the one that is most
recent at the time of effectiveness of Revised Article 9 rather than at
the time of the continuation filing under Revised Article 9. Under this
interpretation, it would be impossible for a filing under Revised
Article 9 to comply with the statute if that filing preceded the
continuation statement required to be filed under Old Article 9.
The transition rules are drafted on the general assumption that
Revised Article 9 will become effective in all relevant jurisdictions at
the same time. If the history of prior Article 9 amendments is any
indication, this assumption is unlikely to prove universally true. The
30. See id. § 9-708(b). It may be argued that, even when the filing under Revised Article 9
does not operate to continue the prior filing, the date of the prior filing should nonetheless be
used for purposes of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section 9-322(a) when there has been no
lapse of perfection. This argument, however, has been rejected in analogous circumstances
under Old Article 9, see In re Hilyard Drilling Co., 840 F.2d 596, 600-01 (8th Cir. 1988);
Bostwick-Braun Co. v. Owens, 634 F. Supp. 839, 840 (E.D. Wis. 1986), and is not likely to
prevail under Revised Article 9.
31. See R. § 9-706 cmt. 2.
32. See id. § 9-706 cmt. 1. While Revised Article 9 would upon its effectiveness make the
filing effective as an initial financing statement, nothing in Revised Article 9 would cure the
consequences of lapse so as to permit its priority to relate back. See id.
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likely circumstance that at least some jurisdictions will continue to be
governed by Old Article 9 for some period of time after July 1, 2001
creates a different kind of transition-one which is not addressed, and
indeed could not be effectively addressed, in Revised Article 9.
Consider the following hypothetical: D is a corporation
organized under the law of State X with its chief executive office
located in State Y. The collateral is accounts. Litigation concerning
perfection of the security interest is commenced in 2002. At that time,
Revised Article 9 is in effect in State X but Old Article 9 is in effect in
State Y. The applicable law governing perfection depends upon the
selection of the forum state. If the forum is in State Y (or any other
state in which Old Article 9 is in effect), then Former section 9-103(3)
will make the law of State Y the law governing perfection with a
consequent requirement to file in State Y. If, however, the forum is
located in State X (or any other state in which Revised Article 9 is in
effect), perfection will be governed by the law of State X with a
consequent requirement for filing in that jurisdiction. The disparity in
result obviously creates a potentially huge incentive for forum
shopping so long as Old Article 9 remains in effect in any relevant
jurisdiction.
The forum shopping risk is somewhat mitigated by the fact that
Old section 9-103(3) refers one to the law, including the conflict of
laws rules, of the designated jurisdiction. Hence, in a post-2001
environment in which Revised Article 9 is in effect in most
jurisdictions, the choice of a forum state governed by Old Article 9
will change the result in our hypothetical only if the jurisdiction
determined pursuant to Former section 9-103(3) is also governed by
Old Article 9. To illustrate this point, assume that the respective
versions of Article 9 in effect in State X and State Y were reversed,
with Old Article 9 in effect in State X and Revised Article 9 in effect
in State Y. In this case, the local law of State X governs perfection
irrespective of the choice of forum. A Revised Article 9 forum will
refer one directly to State X law; an Old Article 9 forum will refer
one to State Y initially, whose conflict of laws rules (i.e., section 9-301
of Revised Article 9) will in turn refer to State X. If the collateral
were inventory or equipment rather than accounts, however, this
mitigating factor is not present, since Old section 9-103(1) does not
contain the same reference to "conflict of laws rules" of the indicated
jurisdiction. It is possible that such a gloss could be put on the statute
by a court, particularly if in doing so it would avoid egregious forum
shopping. Alternatively, section 1-105 may afford a court grounds for
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declining to apply section 9-103 of the forum state so as to curtail
forum shopping.33
Note under the foregoing variation on our hypothetical,
perfection would depend on a filing in State X which would not be
effective under the law of State X considered in isolation, since it was
not filed in the jurisdiction contemplated by Old Article 9.
Furthermore, if the filing in State X were an initial financing
statement filed as a continuation pursuant to section 9-706, questions
could be raised as to the validity of or authorization for that filing
since sections 9-706 and 9-707 are by hypothesis not in effect in State
X. It is to be hoped, however, that a court, in the interests of
uniformity and commercial certainty, would conclude that such filings
were valid and effective.
The foregoing hypotheticals involving the appropriate filing
jurisdiction at least admit of a practical solution for the secured party:
file in both the Revised Article 9 and Old Article 9 filing jurisdictions.
That solution, however, is probably not available for analogous issues
involving collateral as to which one can perfect by filing a financing
statement under Revised Article 9 but not under Old Article 9. This
difference may result either from collateral included within the scope
of Revised Article 9 but not Old Article 9 (e.g., commercial tort
claims) or from collateral as to which one can perfect by filing under
Revised Article 9 but not Old Article 9 (e.g., instruments). Consider
the following hypothetical: D is a corporation organized under the
law of State X. The collateral is a promissory note located at D's
office in State Y. Litigation concerning perfection of the security
interest is commenced in 2002. At that time Revised Article 9 is in
effect in State X but Old Article 9 is in effect in State Y. SP has filed a
financing statement in State X to perfect its security interest. As with
the hypothetical concerning accounts, the result turns on the choice of
forum. A forum in State X will apply Revised Article 9 and conclude
that the security interest is perfected. A forum in State Y will apply
Old Article 9 reaching the opposite conclusion. Note that even if SP
filed a financing statement in State Y as well as State X, it would not
change the result under Old Article 9. Furthermore, if we reverse the
versions of Article 9 in effect in States X and Y, SP loses in both
forums. As with the analogous hypothetical above, State X law (Old
33. In such circumstances, the court might conclude that the forum state's UCC, including
Old section 9-103, was inapplicable because the transaction did not bear an appropriate relation
to the forum state. Cf. id. § 9-307 cmt. 3.
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Article 9) governs perfection in either case; since the security
interests cannot be perfected by filing under Old Article 9, it is
unperfected unless SP has also perfected by possession.
The foregoing are only a few of the hypothetical conflicts which
may arise between Revised Article 9 and Old Article 9, and indeed
are among the simpler examples. As noted in the Official Comments,
the potential complications from the coexistence of these bodies of
law are "horrendous. '34 This is in itself a compelling reason for state
legislatures to enact Revised Article 9 before July 1, 2001. The
adverse consequences of a lack of uniformity should outweigh any
plausible perceived benefit of a rule of existing law as compared with
Revised Article 9.
34. Id. § 9-701 cmt.
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